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  Paul S. Calem, Michael B. Gordy, and Loretta J. Mester 
 





To explain persistence of credit card interest rates at relatively high levels, Calem and Mester 
(AER, 1995) argued that informational barriers create switching costs for high-balance customers.  As 
evidence, using data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, they showed that these households 
were more likely to be rejected when applying for new credit.  In this paper, we revisit the question using 
the 1998 and 2001 SCF.  Further, we use new information on card interest rates to test for pricing effects 
consistent with information-based switching costs.  We find that informational barriers to competition 
persist, although their role may have declined. 
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Persistence of credit card interest rates at relatively high levels has been the subject of lively 
debate.  Simple explanations based on consumer search have not generally been supported by the data.  
Berlin and Mester (2004) find that consumer search costs were likely not adequate to explain imperfect 
competition in the credit card market.  They found that the distributions of credit card rates in the 1980s, a 
time when search costs were thought to be significant, were inconsistent with those derived from many 
models of search.  Ausubel (1991) documented rate stickiness and the persistence of high issuer profits 
during the 1980s.  He proposed an adverse selection model in which low-risk consumers underestimate 
their likelihood of borrowing and thus are less sensitive to interest rates than high-risk consumers.  In this 
case, card issuers would be discouraged from competing on interest rate, because a rate cut would 
disproportionately attract high-risk borrowers.   
Calem and Mester (1995) proposed an alternative explanation of persistence in credit card rates.  
They argued that such persistence is consistent with imperfect competition for high-balance customers 
that is tied to information-based barriers to switching between issuers.  In particular, switching costs may 
arise because card issuers cannot readily distinguish between applicants intending to switch and those 
intending to accumulate more debt, implying that high-balance customers may have difficulty qualifying 
for new credit.  Adverse-selection effects may compound these switching costs because those seeking to 
accumulate more debt are likely to have the stronger incentive to respond to a solicitation.  For example, 
they may have been denied higher credit limits by their current issuer on the basis of private information. 
Calem and Mester (1995) found general support for these theories using data from the 1989 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).  They found that households with larger balances were more likely 
to be rejected or to be granted a lower-than-desired credit limit when applying for new credit and thus 
might have found it difficult to switch from one card issuer to another.  In addition, they found that credit   2
card borrowing was inversely correlated with a household’s willingness to comparison shop for loans and 
deposits.   
Much has changed in the credit card industry since 1989.  In particular, advances in credit scoring 
technology and data quality have led to widespread use of automated systems for the prescreening and 
solicitation of card applicants.  Proponents claim that these advances improve issuers’ ability to judge 
creditworthiness and lower evaluation costs.  Moreover, marketing innovations, such as the development 
of affinity card programs, may have improved issuers’ ability to target solicitation activity to higher 
credit-quality borrowers.  If so, then the economic significance of information-based barriers to switching 
should be reduced, enabling the market to become more competitive. 
Existing evidence on whether the market has evolved in this direction is mixed and somewhat 
difficult to interpret.  On the one hand, anecdotal evidence concerning the introduction of balance transfer 
checks coupled with offers of teaser rates suggests that the cost of switching among cards may be lower 
now.  Crook (2002) and Kerr and Dunn (2002) used data from the 1998 SCF to revisit Calem and 
Mester’s (1995) analysis.  Using the later data, they find no relation between search behavior and credit 
card balance, consistent with reduced barriers to searching and switching and, hence, a more competitive 
market structure.  On the other hand, the rapid expansion of solicitation activity and new card issuance in 
the mid-1990s was accompanied by unexpectedly large increases in delinquency rates (Ausubel 1999, 
Gross and Souleles 2002), consistent with information-based switching costs or adverse selection 
problems associated with solicitation activity.  Moreover, while spreads between credit card and money 
market rates trended down some during the 1990s, they continued to exhibit a degree of “stickiness” 
relative to general market rates. 
This paper provides further evidence on possible changes in the informational structure of the 
credit card market.  First, we compare the results using the 1998 and 2001 SCF data with the results using 
the 1989 SCF data to explore the consistency of the empirical evidence.  If information-based barriers to 
switching have become less important, then pre-existing levels of household credit card debt should be   3
less associated with credit denial in 1998 and 2001 than in 1989.  Second, we construct an entirely new 
test, one that investigates pricing effects attributable to informational barriers to competition, using 
information on credit card interest rates, which was newly available in the 1998 and 2001 SCF.  For this 
analysis, we also rely on a pseudo credit score that we construct for each respondent to the SCF.  We 
analyze the relationship between credit card balances and interest rates, controlling for other observable 
risk characteristics via the pseudo credit score. 
As in 1989, we find that in 1998 and 2001, high-balance households remain more likely to be 
rejected or to be granted a lower-than-desired credit limit when applying for new credit.  Important in 
making this conclusion is controlling for reverse causality, i.e., the possibility that households that are 
temporarily liquidity constrained resort to borrowing on their credit cards and running up balances, rather 
than high credit card balances resulting in reduced access to credit.  We control for this possibility by 
segmenting the sample of households into groups that are less likely to be subject to liquidity shocks.  In 
addition, we find that a large credit card balance represents an impediment to obtaining a better interest 
rate, particularly for consumers with lower scores.  This holds true for the full sample and also for the 
subsamples of liquidity unconstrained households.  Taken together, our findings suggest that information-
based barriers to switching have remained relevant in the credit card market despite the many changes 
seen in the market over the past decade. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The following section surveys recent developments in the 
credit card market.  Section 3 reviews the Calem and Mester (1995) hypothesis of informational barriers 
to competition.  The section describes our empirical strategy for evaluating the continuing validity of this 
theory, including our strategy for handling possible endogeneity problems.  Section 4 presents an update 
of the Calem and Mester (1995) analysis of the relationship between credit card balances and likelihood 
of being rejected for new credit.  Section 5 presents the new empirical analysis of pricing effects, and 
section 6 concludes. 
   4
2. Recent Developments in the Credit Card Market 
The credit card market has undergone a number of important changes since the 1980s.  These 
include rapid growth in direct mail solicitations and related marketing innovations; expansion in the use 
of card credit and in consumer debt burdens; and increased delinquency rates on cards.  
Credit card marketing.  Some of the most striking changes pertain to activities designed to market 
cards.  The volume of direct mail solicitations in the U.S. grew dramatically from about 990 million in 
1991 to about 2.7 billion in 1995, to 3.4 billion in 1998, to 5.0 billion in 2001.
1  Typically, these 
solicitations offered introductory teaser rates, which are very low relative to average card rates, and also 
offered balance transfer checks, making it easy for customers to switch their balances outstanding on 
other cards to the new card being issued.
2  During this period, affinity card and co-branding programs 
often were used as marketing channels.
3  Co-branding, in particular, increased substantially in popularity 
during the 1990s; by 1996, the majority of large issuers offered co-branded card products (American 
Bankers Association, 1995, 1996). 
Credit card usage.  Another prominent feature of the market during this period was a significant 
expansion of the use of card credit, both in terms of number of cards used and the amount of outstanding 
balances.  As reported by Durkin (2000) and updated here, the amount of revolving credit outstanding, as 
a percentage of disposable personal income, increased significantly, from about 5 percent in 1990 to over 
9 percent in 2004 (Figure 1).  Revolving credit also has become a larger share of consumer credit 
                                                      
1 See Furletti (2003).  His source for these data was BAI Global Mail Monitor. 
 
2 As cited in a 1998 Wall Street Journal article, the market research firm Behavioral Analysis Inc. estimated that 
almost three-quarters of standard Visa and MasterCard solicitations contained balance-transfer applications and 
more than 60 percent included teaser rates (Bailey and Kilman, 1998).   
 
3 Affinity card plans, which gained popularity in the late 1980s, are joint marketing arrangements between a credit 
card issuer and a group (club, religious group, labor union, professional organization, or business) that markets the 
card to its members or customers and receives a share of interest or fee income earned on the card (American 
Bankers Association, 1988).  Co-branding refers to the case where the affinity group is a business that markets the 
card to its customers.  In the case of an affinity group that is a non-profit organization, a major appeal to the 
cardholder is the opportunity to support the organization.  In the case of co-branding, consumers typically 
accumulate “points” good for rebates on purchases of the co-branded product(s).  One popular type of co-branding is 
with airline companies; in this case, accumulated points are exchangeable for flight tickets.      5
outstanding – in 1990, revolving credit’s share was 28 percent; in 2003, its share was 37 percent 
(Figure 2).  The Survey of Consumer Finance data indicate an increase in card balances as well as in cards 
per household, and in credit limits offered to customers.  According to the SCF in 1989, 67 percent of 
respondent households reported having at least one bank credit card, with an average of two cards per 
household (among those reporting at least one card).  By 1998, 75 percent of households had at least one 
card, with an average of 2.5 cards per household.  By 2001, 79 percent of households had at least one 
card, with an average of 2.5 cards per household.
4  The average revolving balance among those 
respondents having at least one card rose from $761 in 1989 to $1577 in 1998; it fell back slightly to 
$1431 in 2001 (measured in constant 1989 dollars.)   
Credit card portfolio performance. At the same time that the use of credit cards expanded, there 
was deterioration in the performance of credit card portfolios.  Delinquency and charge-off rates on credit 
cards rose between 1995 and 1997, despite a strong economy, to levels nearly as high as the previous 
peak in 1991, which was tied to the 1990 recession (Figure 3).  After peaking in 1997, they remained at 
historically high levels, rising again during the 2001 recession before subsiding somewhat during the 
recovery. 
The significance of all of these developments was reflected in major realignments of market 
shares during the 1990s.  For instance, MBNA and First USA rapidly grew market share during this 
period – an achievement widely attributed to their creative uses of affinity and co-branding programs.
5  
AT&T and GE entered the market early in the decade via co-branded cards issued by credit card bank 
subsidiaries and quickly achieved large market shares.
6  Some major issuers were particularly hard hit by 
                                                      
4 The SCF uses multiple imputation techniques to fill in missing values, creating five “implicates” of each data 
record.  These figures are based on the first implicate in the SCF data.  See Kennickell (1998) for a discussion of the 
imputation procedure used in the SCF. 
  
5 MBNA and First USA ranked 15
th and lower than 20
th, respectively, in 1989.  But by 1997 they were among the 
five largest issuers with respect to owned and managed receivables (American Bankers Association, 1990, 1997).  
On June 30, 2005, Bank of America announced it will acquire MBNA, with the action expected to be completed by 
the end of 2005.  
 
6 As of January 1, 1997, AT&T ranked 8th and GE ranked 17th (American Bankers Association, 1997).
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deterioration in credit quality after 1995.  For instance, by 1999, Advanta and AT&T had exited the 
consumer card industry in the wake of deteriorating portfolios.
7 
Credit card competition. It is reasonable to conjecture that these developments indicate an 
increasingly competitive environment for card issuers.  The adoption of automated systems for the 
prescreening and solicitation of card applications may have reduced consumer switching costs and 
mitigated adverse selection associated with consumer switching.  At the same time, marketing 
innovations and expanded solicitation activity by card issuers may have increased the willingness of 
consumers to comparison shop for lower rates, as suggested by Crook (2002) and Kerr and Dunn (2002).  
Indeed, growth in card marketing activity and borrowing is consistent with improved credit 
screening processes and increased competition, both of which may lead to lower prices and an expanded 
supply of credit.  Moreover, deterioration in credit quality is consistent with increased competition 
prompting issuers to expand usage among less creditworthy customers.  In fact, Black and Morgan (1999) 
demonstrate that between 1989 and 1995, there were increases in the proportions of credit cards held by 
younger persons, lower-income persons, and those working in blue-collar occupations, and an increase in 
the overall debt burden (debt payment-to-income ratios) of cardholders.  They argue that these factors 
may help explain the subsequent rise in credit card delinquency. 
These observed outcomes also are consistent, however, with information-based switching costs or 
with adverse selection problems associated with solicitation activity.  To the extent that the solicitation 
draws in less creditworthy customers than expected, or customers who unexpectedly increase their overall 
borrowing (i.e., retain, rather than transfer, their old balances), then realized charge-off rates would be 
higher than issuers expected.  The evidence presented by Ausubel (1999) and Gross and Souleles (2002) 
suggest that some of the rise in delinquencies after 1995 was, in fact, unanticipated by issuers. 
  Rates and spreads.  Interest rates on credit cards declined substantially over the past decade, 
consistent with a general decline in market rates.  The average credit card yield declined steadily from 
                                                      
7 Major bank mergers and acquisitions during this period, such as Chase Manhattan with Chemical Bank and Bank 
of America with NationsBank, also caused realignments of market share.    7
about 18 percent in the first quarter of 1992 to just 12.5 percent in the last quarter of 2004 (Figure 4).  It is 
tempting to conclude that this decline in credit card rates is due to competition taking hold in the credit 
card market.  However, the behavior of spreads between credit card rates and other market rates does not 
necessarily indicate that pricing has become more competitive.  Credit card spreads reached historically 
high levels in 1991 through 1993, following the steep decline in general market rates after 1989, and then 
returned to levels more comparable with historical spreads as credit card rates fell and general market 
rates increased (Figure 5).  The pattern of rate movements since 1991 also suggests that credit card 
interest rates have remained sticky and that spreads continue to vary countercyclically.  Moreover, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions based on the behavior of credit card spreads due to two complicating factors.  
First, these spreads are affected by variation in expected credit losses, which are difficult to measure.  
Second, as documented by Stango (2002), in recent years issuers have increasingly provided adjustable-
rate plans, which likely would have altered the dynamic behavior of measured spreads.
8 
  In sum, developments in the credit card market over the past decade suggest that the extent to 
which switching costs and adverse selection problems may affect the credit card market may have 
changed, but existing evidence is mixed and difficult to interpret.  Our empirical work seeks to shed new 
light on whether these factors continue to be substantial impediments to competition. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
Calem and Mester (1995) attributed persistence of credit card interest rates at relatively high 
levels to an imperfectly competitive market structure tied to information-based barriers to switching 
between issuers for customers with large balances.  They argue that issuers may interpret large card 
balances as a signal of credit risk because they are unable to distinguish card borrowers who are intending 
                                                      
8 Stango (2002) reports that the percentage of credit card accounts with a variable rate increased from 3 percent to 
57 percent between 1989 and 1994 based on a panel data set of the 250 largest credit card issuers.  He argues that 
offering the choice between fixed and adjustable rate plans represents a way for issuers to price discriminate among 
customers with different switching costs. 
   8
to use a new card to increase their total debt outstanding (thus becoming overextended) and those who are 
planning just to switch their current balance to the new card.  This creates a switching cost because higher 
balance borrowers are relatively likely to face rejection when they apply for another card; i.e., customers 
tend to be “locked-in” to their current issuer once they accumulate a sizable balance.
9  Adverse selection 
effects may compound these switching costs due to important information asymmetries between current 
and prospective issuers.
10  For instance, as noted, applicants seeking to accumulate more debt may include 
those who had been denied higher credit limits by their current issuer on the basis of private 
information.
11   
  A simple, stylized example can serve to illustrate the information-based switching cost and 
adverse selection hypotheses.  Suppose that among the population of borrowers many will have the ability 
to repay one unit of principal, plus interest, but not two units, but that this would not deter these 
borrowers from borrowing two units and then defaulting.  Then issuers will impose a credit limit of one 
unit and those borrowing the unit will have difficulty switching to another issuer, because that would 
require seeking additional credit by applying for a new card.  Over time, issuers may be able to 
distinguish which of their own borrowers are less likely to borrow more than they can repay and may 
grant them higher credit limits, making these borrowers even less likely to switch to another issuer. 
Calem and Mester (1995) tested the information-based switching cost hypothesis using data from 
the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
12  They found that households with larger balances were 
                                                      
9 One could argue that individuals simply might reapply until they find an issuer willing to grant them a card.  
However, such a process would not be costless.  There is the potential for a reduced credit rating resulting from 
multiple inquiries into the consumer’s credit record, and the time and effort expended on the application process.  
There may also be a psychological cost associated with rejection for credit.  Issuers must also bear costs associated 
with evaluating applications. 
 
10 Mester (1994) presents and analyzes a theoretical model of adverse selection in credit card markets. 
 
11 Consumer credit histories available from credit reporting agencies do not indicate changes in credit limits, and 
even current limits are sometimes not reported (Avery, Calem, and Canner, 2003).    
 
12 The SCF is a triennial survey of U.S. households sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System in cooperation with the U.S. Department of the Treasury and conducted by the Survey Research Center at 
the University of Michigan.  The survey provides detailed information on U.S. families’ assets and liabilities and 
their use of financial services, income, and housing and demographic characteristics, as of the date of the interview.    9
more likely to be rejected or to be granted a lower-than-desired credit limit when applying for new credit, 
and were more likely to have experienced payment problems, consistent with information-based 
switching costs and adverse selection problems in the credit card market. 
Our empirical strategy for investigating the degree to which this argument may still apply has two 
parts.  First, we revisit the Calem and Mester (1995) analysis of the probability of being denied access to 
credit and compare the results obtained using 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finance data with 
those based on 1989 SCF data.
13  If information-based barriers to switching have become less important, 
then pre-existing levels of household credit card debt should be less associated with credit denial in 1998 
and 2001 than in 1989.  Further, we explore the robustness of the results to using information that was 
available in the 1998 and 2001 SCF but that was unavailable in the 1989 SCF used by Calem and Mester 
(1995).  Specifically, rather than asking simply whether the respondent had been denied credit, the 1998 
and 2001 surveys first determined whether credit had been applied for and then whether credit had been 
denied.  Thus, the denial regression can be better specified with the 1998 and 2001 data.  We also perform 
tests that are better able to control for potential endogeneity problems and reverse causality, namely, we 
repeat our analysis for subgroups of households that are less likely to be subject to temporary negative 
liquidity shocks and therefore be credit constrained. 
Our second test is entirely new and focuses on pricing effects attributable to switching costs 
among high-balance customers, using new data in the 1998 and 2001 SCF on card interest rates.  This test 
also relies on “pseudo credit scores” that we calculate for each SCF respondent using an imputation 
equation based on data from a major national credit bureau.  Credit scores are summary measures of an 
individual’s credit risk based on records maintained in credit bureau files.  Such information includes 
number and types of credit accounts of the individual; dates opened and closed; outstanding balances on 
open accounts; payment histories, including occurrences of delinquency; credit line utilization rates; and 
                                                      
13 We also investigated the probability of experiencing debt repayment difficulties, but for the sake of brevity focus 
on the more direct test involving probability of being credit constrained. (The results pertaining to repayment 
difficulties are available from the authors.)   10
incidences of “major derogatory” such as bankruptcy filing, legal judgment, or debt collection.  It is 
standard practice for credit card issuers to use credit scores to determine which applications to accept and 
the terms to assign.  
The intuition behind this test is that the relationship between credit card interest rates and account 
balances would be affected, in a predictable manner, by the informational structure of the market.  In the 
absence of informational impediments to switching, competitive rates should be available to those 
households expending sufficient search effort, so-called shoppers, with a lower competitive rate for 
lower-risk households, as measured by the pseudo credit score.  Under these circumstances, the credit 
card interest rate will decline with card balance, since larger balances imply greater benefit from search.  
It will decline quickly for shoppers to the most competitive available rate (presuming search costs are 
low), and less quickly for non-shoppers to a rate above the competitive level.  However, if there are 
information-based switching costs and adverse selection effects, they would impede the decline toward a 
competitive rate as credit card balance increases.  Instead, the interest rate may decline only gradually, or 
it might not decline at all and/or may rise as balance increases.  
Importantly, these effects of informational impediments to competition – in particular, the 
potential for the interest rate to rise with the card balance – may be greater for non-shoppers and those 
with higher credit risk (i.e., lower credit scores).  Aggressive shopping by consumers perceived as low 
credit risks may overcome switching costs to some degree, since issuers may remain relatively confident 
that such customers can manage larger card balances or are likely to transfer their balances rather than 
add to them.   
An important potential problem in both of our tests is the possibility of reverse causality and the 
potential endogeneity of credit card balances, which is included as a regressor.  The theory of 
information-based barriers to switching says that high credit card balance is a signal of elevated credit risk 
and, therefore, leads to denial of applications and higher interest rates.  But there is a possibility that when 
households are denied credit and are then faced with liquidity shocks, they resort to borrowing on their   11
credit cards.  In this case, a positive relationship between credit card balance and the probability of credit 
denial would not indicate information-based barriers to switching.  Alternatively, if the borrower’s credit 
constraints apply to credit card borrowing as well, then the probability of credit denial might be 
associated (ceteris paribus) with lower credit card balances.   
While this is a potential issue, it may not be a significant problem.  First, households with large 
revolving balances tend to maintain their level of card borrowing over long periods of time.  A regression 
of credit card balance on credit card balance lagged five years (and a constant term) using the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics data from 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999 yields a coefficient of 0.59 on lagged 
balances, which implies a coefficient of 0.90 (= 0.59
1/5) based on annual intervals.
14  This high persistence 
suggests that, by and large, credit card debt is more associated with medium- or long-term financing (e.g., 
life-cycle smoothing) than with short-term and unanticipated liquidity shocks.  Second, the ability of 
consumers to substitute card borrowing for other types of credit is limited; for instance, card borrowing 
typically cannot take the place of an auto loan or home purchase loan.
15  The ubiquity of credit card debt, 
despite the relatively high interest rates charged, is itself evidence that cheaper alternatives are imperfect 
substitutes.  Finally, it by no means contradicts our proposed information-driven switching cost to 
observe that causality may sometimes run from credit denial to increased credit card borrowing.  
Consider, for example, a household that is rejected for a debt consolidation loan because the lender is 
unsure whether the borrower will end up simply adding to existing balances.  Were the household then to 
increase its credit card borrowing following rejection, the lender would see evidence to justify its 
reluctance to lend. 
  Nonetheless, it is important that we try to address this potential issue in our empirical work.  To 
this end, we identify subsamples of households that may be expected to be less subject to temporary 
                                                      
14 Including time dummies in the regression to control for trend yields a coefficient of 0.61, which implies a 
coefficient of 0.91 at annual levels.  The authors thank Wenli Li for providing these results. 
15 To the contrary, households might reduce their credit card balances after having applications denied because of 
excessive card debt and they might increase card borrowing after successfully being approved for credit.  Therefore, 
our regression equation might underestimate the impact of informational barriers to switching.     12
liquidity shocks given their financial condition and, thus less subject to the problem of reverse causality.  
We find that our results for the entire sample hold qualitatively on these subsamples as well.  
With respect to our second test, which investigates the relationship between credit card interest 
rate and credit card balance, the possibility of reverse causality is less of an issue.  To the extent that 
liquidity constrained households are higher risk and therefore pay higher rates, this would be controlled 
for in our credit card interest rate regressions by the pseudo credit score, which includes credit card 
balances as a factor.  Also, to the extent that higher rates induce households to borrow less, the bias in the 
interest rate regression induced by the potential endogeneity of credit card balances would be against 
finding evidence of information-based barriers to switching.  Nonetheless, we investigate whether our 
interest-rate results are robust across the subgroups of households that are less likely to be subject to 
temporary liquidity problems.    
 
4. Credit Card Balance and Likelihood of Being Credit Constrained 
Specification and variables.  We first address whether there has been a change in the 
informational structure of the credit card market by revisiting the original Calem and Mester (1995) 
analysis using the 1998 and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finance and comparing the results to those 
obtained by Calem and Mester (1995), who used the 1989 SCF.  Within this context, we expand and 
refine Calem and Mester’s (1995) specification of control variables for the analysis and the sample 
construction, as described below.  Specifically, we estimate the probit model: 
TURNDOWN = g(CCBAL, DELINQUENT, X1).      (1) 
TURNDOWN indicates whether a household is credit-constrained and equals 1 if at least once 
during the five-year period preceding the particular SCF survey, the household submitted an application 
for credit and had the application denied, in whole or in part, and equals 0 otherwise.
16  CCBAL denotes 
                                                      
16The SCF asked: “In the past five years, has a particular lender or creditor turned down any request you (or your 
husband/wife) made for credit, or not given you as much credit as you applied for?”  In 1998 and 2001, the SCF 
additionally inquired whether the respondent household had made any applications for credit.     13
total revolving balance on bank credit cards.
17  A positive relationship between CCBAL and 
TURNDOWN suggests that applicants with large amounts of card debt have difficulty transferring the 
debt because the debt is viewed as a signal of credit risk, consistent with informational barriers to 
switching.  We believe that this interpretation is valid even though TURNDOWN applies to any 
application for credit, not just card credit.  For a variety of types of credit in addition to card credit, such 
as unsecured personal loans and lines of credit, cash-out refinance loans, and home equity loans and lines 
of credit, the potential lender must consider whether a loan applicant intends to add to or transfer existing 
card balances.  Moreover, we have no other reason to expect a positive relationship between CCBAL and 
TURNDOWN after controlling for the other household financial variables described below.
  
DELINQUENT is included in equation (1) to control for the influence of applicant credit history 
on the disposition of loan applications; it equals 1 if within the past year the household fell behind in a 
payment, and 0 otherwise.   
The vector X1 controls for a variety of economic, demographic, and attitudinal factors that may 
correlate with a household’s demand for credit or with a lender’s perception of default risk.  Table 1 
presents the definitions of all variables used in (1) and in the analysis discussed in the following section, 
along with the sample means and standard deviations of these variables.  Many of the variables in X1 are 
identical to variables used in Calem and Mester (1995) and require little elaboration.  These include the 
ratio of monthly home and auto expenses, including mortgage payments, home equity loan payments, and 
auto loan payments to income (MEXP_INC); the number of years that the head of the household has been 
at his/her current job (CUREMP); the number of years at the current address (CURADD); a dummy 
variable identifying homeowners (HOMEOWN); a dummy variable identifying non-white respondents 
(RACE); and years of schooling of the head of the household (EDU).  Also following Calem and Mester 
(1995), we include the household’s total available credit line on bank credit cards; i.e., total credit limit 
                                                      
17 The SCF asked respondents to report the “balance still owed” on their bank-type credit card accounts “after the 
last payment was made on these accounts.”  Throughout the paper, we equate credit card debt with the dollar amount 
reported in response to this question.   14
net of outstanding debt (AVAILBAL); and three indicators of the respondent’s attitude toward credit 
(ATT_INST, ATT_VACA, and ATT_JEWE).  The latter represent, respectively, attitude toward 
installment credit generally, toward borrowing to finance a vacation, and toward borrowing to finance the 
purchase of jewelry or furs, and equal 1 if the respondent believes it is a bad idea to borrow and 0 
otherwise. 
We have expanded and refined the set of control variables (X1) somewhat relative to Calem and 
Mester (1995).  Here, we use a more comprehensive measure of non-liquid financial assets and in contrast 
to the original specification, we measure liquid assets (LIQ), non-liquid financial assets (NONLIQ), and 
income (INC) in logs, i.e., our specification includes ln(LIQ), ln(NONLIQ), and ln(INC).  We define 
DEBT_INC as the ratio of household debt to income.  Here, household debt excludes home mortgage, 
home equity loans, and automobile loans, since the monthly payments on these are included in 
MEXP_INC.  Note that households with higher levels of non-auto consumer debt relative to their income 
may be viewed as greater credit risks when applying for new loans, due to the debt burdens they already 
carry.  
  In addition, we include a new variable that identifies households with zero non-auto consumer 
debt (ZERO_DEBT).  The relationship between the debt ratio and TURNDOWN may be discontinuous at 
zero debt; for instance applications for credit may be especially rare for households with zero debt.  We 
also include a new variable (NO_HEALTH_INS) indicating whether anyone in the household is without 
health insurance, which could be related to delinquency risk, and we include a new variable (SELFEMP) 
indicating whether the head of household is self-employed, which could affect either credit demand or 
perceived risk.   
We have included an expanded set of demographic variables relative to Calem and Mester (1995) 
that allow for interactions of household size, marital status, and age of the household head.  Other factors 
held constant, larger households may have greater demand for credit, or they may be viewed as greater 
credit risks.  Demand for credit and indicators used by lenders to measure credit risk may vary 
systematically with marital status.  Therefore, we include the interaction of household size with the   15
marital status of the head of household.  Thus, HSIZE_M is household size if the head of household is 
married; HSIZE_D is household size if the head of household is divorced or separated; and HSIZE_S is 
household size if the head of household is widowed or has never married.  We include eight dummy 
variables to control for marital status of the head of household (whether the head of household is married, 
divorced or separated, widowed, or had never been married) interacted with age.  For example, 
MAR_0034 equals 1 if the head of household is married and 34 years old or younger.
18  These variables 
control for life-cycle effects on the demand for credit or on financial sophistication, which in turn may 
affect credit risk.
19 
Addressing potential endogeneity problems.  As discussed above, we recognize that this test 
suffers from potential endogeneity between CCBAL and TURNDOWN.  We therefore re-estimate 
equation (1) for three groups of households who are less likely to be subject to temporary liquidity 
problems.  These groups are homeowners; households with total yearly income of at least $30,000; and 
households with stock and bond holdings of at least $2,000.  If we find a positive relationship between 
TURNDOWN and CCBAL for these subgroups, this would be confirming evidence of information-based 
barriers to switching, as these subgroups are less likely to exhibit the potential reverse causality problem. 
Our regressions may also be subject to a classic errors-in-variables form of endogeneity due to a 
mismatch in the time windows used in defining CCBAL and TURNDOWN.  Ideally, one would want to 
observe the value of CCBAL at the time of the credit application to which TURNDOWN corresponds. 
Instead, TURNDOWN indicates whether the household experienced a rejection for credit any time in the 
                                                      
18 The base regression refers to the head of household who is married and over 64 years old.  We include 
MAR_0034, MAR_3554, and MARI_5564 to distinguish heads of household who are married and are 34 years old 
or younger, between 35 and 54, and between 55 and 64, respectively.  We include DIV_0034 and DIV_3554 to 
distinguish heads of household who are divorced and 34 years old or younger, or between 35 and 54, respectively.  
We include SNG_0034 and SNG_3554 to distinguish heads of household who are widowed or never married and 
are 34 years old or younger or between 35 and 54.  We include NMAR_5564 and NMAR_65 to distinguish heads of 
household who are not married and are between 55 and 64 or at least 65 years old.  Note that these people may be 
divorced, widowed, or never married. 
19 Calem and Mester (1995) control for household size, marital status, and age, but do not allow for interactions.  In 
addition, Calem and Mester (1995) control for whether the head of the household is male or female.  This variable is 
highly correlated with marital status and appears to have little additional explanatory power, so we have excluded it.    16
past five years, while CCBAL measures current credit card balances, which may differ from the balances 
held at the time of application for credit.   
To a considerable degree, the impact of this timing mismatch is alleviated by the high persistence 
of a household’s credit card debt, as discussed above.  More important, the timing mismatch would, if 
anything, bias the coefficient on credit card balance in our credit denial regressions downward, not 
upward, and therefore would tend to work against finding evidence in favor of information-based barriers 
to switching.  To see this, consider three cases.  First, suppose the household had been hit by a temporary 
liquidity shock in the past and applied for credit.  The bank would have observed a high credit card 
balance and possibly rejected the application.  By the time of the SCF survey, however, the household 
might have paid down the temporarily high credit card balance, and so we would observe in the data a 
low CCBAL associated with a credit denial.  Next, suppose the household applied for credit and was 
approved, and then faced a temporary liquidity shock that raised its credit card balance at the time of the 
survey.  This again would bias the coefficient on credit card balance toward zero.  Last, consider a 
household that faced a long-term liquidity shock in the past and raised its credit card borrowing in 
response.  In this case, the information in the SCF regarding the household’s credit quality would be valid 
and the mis-timing would not create a bias in the regression. 
As is the case with CCBAL, the relationship between TURNDOWN and DELINQUENT is 
subject to measurement error and potential endogeneity.  Again, there are some mitigating considerations; 
for instance, for many households, payment problems persist over long periods.  Moreover, even if the 
borrower was not delinquent on any credit at the time of application for credit, current payment problems 
might be related to other financial circumstances (such as over-indebtedness) that were responsible for 
rejection of the application.   
There is also a potential endogeneity issue with respect to the debt-to-income ratio DEBT_INC.  
A household’s current ratio of consumer debt-to-income depends on whether it was credit constrained in 
the past.  So, the estimated coefficient on DEBT_INC may understate the degree to which indebtedness   17
reduces a household’s current access to credits.  Similarly, there may be a causality problem with 
HOMEOWN, since a household might have been rejected for mortgage credit at some point within the 
past five years, which would lead to HOMEOWN = 0 and simultaneously, TURNDOWN = 1. Thus, 
equation (1) may exaggerate the extent to which homeownership reduces credit constraints. 
The SCF design and estimation.  The SCF uses a dual-frame sample design that overlays a 
standard geographically based random sample with a special sample of relatively wealthy households.
20  
Weights are provided for combining observations from the two samples to allow for inferences pertaining 
to the full U.S population.  Calem and Mester (1995) do not make use of these weights, but simply 
exclude households with incomes over $250,000 or with more than $1 million in stocks, bonds, and liquid 
assets.  To improve efficiency and better align our sample with the credit card portfolios of U.S. banks, 
we include in the sample all households with at least one bank credit card, and apply the population 
weights in our regressions.
21 
Beginning with the 1989 survey, missing data in the SCF have been imputed using a multiple 
imputation model.
22  Each missing value in the survey is imputed five times, resulting in five replicate 
data sets, referred to as “implicates.” Calem and Mester (1995) focused on the first implicate, and verified 
consistency of the results across individual implicates.  Here, we pool the five implicates and adjust the 
estimates of the standard errors of the regression coefficients for multiple imputation, following the 
procedure described in Kennickell (2000).   Essentially, the standard error of the regression coefficient is 
the average over the five implicates of the standard error of the regression coefficient, i.e., the sigma, for 
each implicate, plus an adjustment for the sample variance of the sigmas across the implicates.   
                                                      
20 See Kennickell (2000) for details. 
21 For completeness, we also estimated the original specifications, applying the original sample restrictions and 
without weighting, using the 1989, 1998, and 2001 SCF data.  Qualitatively the results match those discussed in the 
paper.  We also estimated the regressions using the 1995 survey data.  These results are similar to those obtained 
using the 1998 data. 
22 See Kennickell (1991, 1998) for details. 
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Results for the full sample.  Table 2 presents our estimates of equation (1) for the full sample of 
households with at least one bank credit card.  The main finding is that, as was true in 1989, there remains 
a significant positive relationship between credit card balances (CCBAL) and being credit constrained 
(TURNDOWN) in both 1998 and in 2001.  This finding is consistent with a continuing role of 
informational barriers to switching between issuers for borrowers with existing large credit card balances.  
The estimated coefficient on CCBAL declines in magnitude over time, but the decline is not statistically 
significant.
23, 
24  In 2001, the estimates suggest that the probability of being credit constrained increases 
about a half percentage point for each $1,000 increase in credit card debt. 
 Many of the control variables, including income, homeownership status, and incidence of recent 
delinquency, exhibit relationships to TURNDOWN that are consistent across survey years with respect to 
the sign and the magnitude or statistical significance of the estimated coefficient.
25  We find relatively 
little consistency over time, however, in relationships between household demographic variables and 
likelihood of being denied for credit. 
Results for the subsamples.  Table 3 presents our estimates of the coefficient on credit card 
balances (CCBAL) in equation (1) for the subsamples of homeowners; households with income of 
$30,000 or more per year; and households with stock and bond holdings of $2,000 or more.  We also 
show the coefficient on CCBAL for the full sample as reported in Table 2 to aid in comparisons.
26  As can 
be seen, there is a consistent positive relationship between credit card balances (CCBAL) and the 
                                                      
23 Such a decline might reflect some erosion of informational barriers, or it simply might reflect instability due to 
colinerarity of CCBAL with ln(LIQ) (the estimated coefficient on ln(LIQ) increases in absolute value over time).  
24 We find that the coefficient on CCBAL in 1989 is statistically different from zero but at a lower level than in 
Calem and Mester (1995).  Apparently with our changes to the specification, more of the relationship between credit 
card balances and the likelihood of being denied for credit is being captured by the DEBT_INC and ZERO_DEBT 
variables.   
25 One notable difference is that the ratio of non-auto consumer debt to income (DEBT_INC) is positively related to 
TURNDOWN only in 1989.  A possible explanation is that with the expansion of lending to low-credit-quality 
borrowers during the second half of the 1990s, this variable became more closely tied to demand for credit as 
opposed to lack of access to credit. 
26 For space considerations we report only the coefficient on CCBAL in Table 3.  The complete estimation results 
are available from the authors.   19
likelihood of being denied for credit (TURNDOWN) over time, both for the full sample and in each 
subgroup.  The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on CCBAL is similar across all years and 
subsamples, and it is statistically significant except in the case of households with higher stock and bond 
holdings in 1998.    
Restricting the sample to applicants for credit.   The 1998 and 2001 SCF data include additional 
information that we can use to refine the sample for which we estimate equation (1), at the cost of not 
being able to look at changes from 1989, since the information was not included in the 1989 survey.  In 
particular, we estimate equation (1) including only those families that applied for credit in the past five 
years.  This sample restriction mitigates the possibility that households with large credit balances appear 
to have a high likelihood of being denied credit because they more frequently apply for credit. 
Results from estimating equation (1) using this refined sample for these two survey years are very 
similar to those for the full sample shown in Table 2.  In particular, as shown in the last row of Table 3, 
the estimated coefficient on CCBAL is very close to that reported for the full sample, and remains 
statistically significant.
27  The observed similarity suggests that unobserved variation across households in 
credit demand does not have any material effect on our estimation of the specification in equation (1).  
  Credit card balance and likelihood of credit problems.  Calem and Mester (1995) also tested the 
relationship between CCBAL and DELINQUENT and found that households with larger card debt 
outstanding remain more likely to experience debt repayment difficulties, other factors held constant.  We 
revisited this analysis as well for 1998 and 2001 and found a significant weakening of the relationship 
between credit card balance and delinquency.  The estimated coefficient of CCBAL was much smaller in 
1998 and 2001 compared to 1989, and in 2001 the estimated coefficient was not statistically significantly 
different from zero.  The coefficient and standard error (in parentheses) for CCBAL was 0.0851 (0.0159) 
in 1989; 0.0181 (0.0065) in 1998; and 0.0071 (0.0075) in 2001
28  Moreover, likelihood ratio tests reject 
                                                      
27 The complete regression results are omitted for brevity but are available from the authors upon request. 
28 Again, the complete regression results are omitted for brevity but are available from the authors upon request.   20
the hypothesis of equality of coefficients between either 1998 or 2001 and 1989.  These findings suggest 
that the ability of lenders to screen applicants for credit risk has improved over time, enabling them to 
fine tune the credit limit in accordance with a household’s ability to repay.  These results do not conflict 
with the evidence from equation (1), since they do not imply the absence of informational impediments to 
switching by high-balance customers, but only that lenders are better able to identify the level of credit 
card balance at which the informational issues become important.  In other words, the informational 
barriers hypothesis suggests that households with large credit card balances will be subject to tighter 
credit standards by lenders in order to compensate for their perceived risk, which would unambiguously 
increase the likelihood of rejection for credit but would have a more ambiguous implication regarding the 
relationship between credit card balances and likelihood of delinquency.   
 
5. A Test for Informational Barriers to Competition Using Credit Card Interest Rates 
The 1998 and 2001 SCF contain information on cardholders’ credit card interest rates. 
Specifically, the survey asked: “What interest rate do you pay on the card where you have the largest 
balances?” or, for households with zero revolving balances, “What is the interest rate on the card you got 
most recently?” The SCF also asked: “When making major decisions about credit or borrowing, some 
people shop around for the very best terms while others don't.  What number would your family be on the 
[1 to 5] scale [almost no shopping to a great deal of shopping]?”  Based on the response to this question, 
we identify households as either non-shoppers (ranking themselves 1, 2, or 3) or shoppers (4 or 5).
29  
This information allows us to implement a new test of information-based switching costs and 
adverse selection in credit card markets that was not possible at the time of the Calem and Mester (1995) 
study.  As discussed above, the test is based on the premise that the ability of higher-balance customers to 
obtain the lowest available interest rate through search would be impeded to the extent that informational 
barriers to switching are present.  A positive or weak relationship between balance and interest rate (more 
                                                      
29 Note that potential endogeneity of the shopping measure in a credit card interest rate regression is mitigated by the 
fact that the question pertains to shopping for any type of credit, not just card credit.   21
likely to be observed for non-shopper and higher risk cohorts) would be evidence consistent with such 
impediments. 
Calculating the pseudo credit score.   The first step in implementing this test was to derive a 
pseudo credit score for SCF respondents, since a credit score variable is not part of the SCF data.  To do 
this we used data in a nationally representative sample of individual credit records obtained by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from a major, national consumer credit reporting agency.  
This database contains credit scores of about 200,000 individuals along with their full credit records as of 
June 1999.  The credit score provided is roughly comparable to a FICO score, with a lower score 
indicating greater credit risk (lower probability of repayment).
30  
We developed an empirical model of the score by regressing credit score on various 
characteristics of the individuals that were included in the credit record database, where we restricted the 
sample to individuals with at least one credit card.  The characteristics that we chose to include were also 
those that would be available for respondents to the SCF.  Some of the key predictive variables were 
indicators for 30-day delinquency and 60-day or longer delinquency within the past year; past bankruptcy; 
combined balance and utilization rate on bank card accounts; presence of a mortgage account in the credit 
file; and age of the individual.  For 1998, the R
2 for the imputation regression equation was 0.70.  In the 
estimation sample, scores ranged from 506 at the 1
st percentile to 819 at the 99
th percentile, with a median 
of 733 and mean of 715; predicted scores ranged from 561 at the 1
st percentile to 818 at the 99
th 
percentile, with a median of 738 and a mean of 724.  Proprietary data considerations constrain our ability 
to report further details of the specification or estimation results. 
The estimated regression model was then applied to the individuals in our 1998 and 2001 SCF 
data sets.  That is, we calculated the pseudo credit score for each individual as the predicted credit score 
                                                      
30 FICO scores are commercially available credit scores developed by Fair, Isaac and Company and have become the 
credit industry standard for evaluating consumer credit risk.  FICO scores range from 200 to 900 with higher values 
representing better credit-quality or lower risk.  The national median score for all households (with or without 
mortgages) is 725.  A decline of 20 points in the score doubles the odds of default.   22
Xb, where X consists of data on the variables included in the regression model and b is the vector of 
estimated coefficients.
31   
The relationship between credit card interest rate, balances, and credit score for the full sample.  
We examine the relationship between credit card interest rate and credit card balances, holding constant 
credit score and other characteristics.  We expect that households who use bank credit cards for 
transaction purposes only would choose a card primarily on the basis of the annual fee and non-price 
amenities, and would have comparatively little reason to consider the interest rate.  Therefore, we 
estimate separate models for households with and without a revolving balance. Those with zero revolving 
balance will be referred to henceforth as “non-revolvers,” and those with positive balances will be 
referred to as “revolvers.”
32 
For non-revolvers, we use OLS to estimate the model: 
 RATE  =  γ0 + γ1SHOP + SCORE × β1Y + γ2SCORE
2 + δZ + ε.            (2) 
RATE denotes the respondent’s reported credit card interest rate, and SHOP is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 for shoppers (as defined above), and zero otherwise.  The vector Y consists of SHOP and 
1−SHOP, and the vector Z incorporates several control variables: log of household income (ln(INC)), 
years-of-education of the household head (EDU), and three age categorical variables (AGE_3554, which 
equals 1 if the individual is 35 to 54 years old and 0 otherwise; AGE_5564, which equals 1 if the 
individual is 55 to 64 years old and 0 otherwise; and AGE_65, which equals 1 if the individual is 65 or 
older and 0 otherwise).
33  We do not a priori expect a relationship between general credit-shopping 
behavior and the credit card rate for non-revolvers, since, as noted, the card interest rate will not be their 
                                                      
31 The main limitation in attempting to predict scores and the main source of unexplained variation in scores in the 
imputation equation are lack of information in the SCF on episodes of delinquency more than one year old, accounts 
in collection, and derogatory public records (other than bankruptcy).  Moreover, even delinquencies within the past 
year may be under-reported in the SCF. 
32 We continue to pool all five implicates and adjust standard errors for multiple imputation. 
33 Table 1 includes definitions of these variables, along with their sample means and standard deviations.   For the 
rate equations, CCBAL and INC are measured in units of 1989 dollars (not in $1,000s of 1989 dollars.)   23
primary focus.  Similarly, it is difficult to predict the relationship between interest rates and credit scores 
for non-revolvers.  For instance, those with high credit scores may hold high-rate cards that offer 
substantial non-price benefits.  We allow for a non-monotonic relationship via inclusion of the pseudo 
credit score (SCORE) interacted with shopping characteristics, and the square of SCORE. 
  For revolvers, we use OLS to estimate the following model: 
   RATE = γ0 + γ1SHOP + SCORE×β1Y+ CCBAL×β2Y + γ2SCORE
2 + γ3SCORE×CCBAL  
   +  CCBAL
2×β3Y + γ4SCORE×CCBAL
2 + δZ + ε.       ( 3 )  
Here CCBAL again denotes revolving balance and Y and Z are the same as in (2).  This model permits 
the relationship between credit card balances and interest rates to vary with the household’s credit risk 
and shopping propensity. 
  Table 4 presents the estimation results.  As indicated by the large difference in R
2 statistics, 
substantially more of the variation in interest rates is explained for revolvers compared to non-revolvers, 
consistent with the hypothesis that non-revolvers are relatively indifferent to the card interest rate. 
  To investigate the relationship between credit card interest rate and credit card balance, we 
compute estimated derivatives and also plot the predicted interest rates.  Table 5 presents the mean value 
(and the standard error of the mean) of the derivative of RATE with respect to SHOP, SCORE, and 
CCBAL for various subgroups of the households.  Also shown is the cross-derivative of RATE with 
respect to CCBAL and SCORE.
34 
  Some informative patterns emerge.  First, predicted interest rates show little relationship with 
score or shopping intensity for non-revolvers.  As shown in Panel A of Table 5, the derivative of RATE 
with respect to SCORE is significant at the 10 percent level for shoppers in 1998, but is of a very small 
magnitude.  It is insignificant for nonshoppers in 1998 and 2001 and for shoppers in 2001.
35    As shown 
                                                      
34 The derivatives will vary for each observation because the values of the independent variables vary over 
observations.  We calculate the derivative for each observation in subgroup of households being considered (e.g., for 
shoppers), and then compute the mean of the derivative over all the observations in the subgroup.  We also compute 
the standard error of this mean.  Table 5 reports these means and standard errors. 
35 Further analysis shows that the significantly positive relationship between RATE and SCORE for the   24
in Panel B of Table 5, we find no significant difference in rate for non-revolving shoppers and non-
revolving non-shoppers – the derivative of RATE with respect to SHOP is insignificantly different from 
zero in both years.  That there is little relationship between credit card interest rate and either score or 
shopping intensity for non-revolvers is consistent with what one would expect given that non-revolvers 
have little incentive to choose a card on the basis of the interest rate – they are more likely to be 
concerned with the annual fee or amenities such as cash-back on purchases.   
  Second, in contrast to non-revolvers, higher scores for revolvers consistently are associated with 
lower interest rates, providing evidence of risk-based pricing.  RATE and SCORE are significantly 
negatively related for revolvers, both shoppers and non-shoppers, in 1998 and 2001.  Thus, higher credit-
quality borrowers tend to get lower interest rates, and the magnitude of the effect is substantial – a ten-
point rise in SCORE yields a 20 to 40 basis point decline in RATE.  Moreover, the derivative of RATE 
with respect to SHOP indicates that revolvers who shop get a significantly lower rate than non-shopping 
revolvers – about 1 to 1.5 percentage points lower.  This is consistent with what one would expect given 
that search is beneficial. 
  Third, as explained earlier, if there were no informational barriers to switching among card 
issuers, one would expect to see a negative relationship between a respondent’s credit card balance and 
credit card interest rate, especially for revolvers who shop, since a higher balance should induce more 
search.  However, if informational barriers to switching exist, then we might find a reversal of the 
relationship between credit card balance and rate, in which the relationship turns positive at higher credit 
card balances as the informational barriers begin to impede the ability to switch to a lower rate.  
Moreover, if such barriers exist, we might expect them to be more severe for respondents who have less 
propensity to shop for rates in the first place (i.e., for non-shoppers) and for those with higher credit risk 
(i.e., lower scores).  To investigate, we estimated the derivative of rate with respect to credit card balance 
                                                                                                                                                                           
nonrevolvers occurs only for the higher credit-quality households.   Evaluating the derivative across three subgroups 
defined by SCORE, we find that the derivative is insignificantly negative for households with SCORE less than 660; 
insignificantly positive for households with SCORE between 660 and 700; and significantly positive (at the 10 
percent level) for households with SCORE greater than 700.    25
(CCBAL), and looked at how that rate varied for different subgroups of borrowers based on credit score.  
The low-score group comprised revolvers with credit scores less than 660.  The mid-score group 
comprised revolvers with credit scores between 660 and 700.  The high-score group comprised borrowers 
with scores of 700 or more.  In addition, we estimated the cross-derivative of RATE with respect to 
CCBAL and SCORE.  This allows us to  test whether the derivative of RATE with respect to CCBAL 
differs significantly by the level of score.                                                                                                                                   
  Our results are presented in Panel C of Table 5.  For higher risk cohorts (i.e., those with low 
scores), we find that the relationship between credit card interest rate and credit card balance is either 
insignificantly negative (for the shoppers) or insignificantly positive (for the non-shoppers), consistent 
with the existence of informational barriers to switching.  For the most creditworthy borrowers (those 
with high scores), rate significantly declines with credit card balance for shoppers in both years, but for 
non-shoppers only in 1998.  This is consistent with our a priori expectation that a positive or weak 
relationship between balance and interest rate is more likely to be observed for non-shoppers and low 
score (i.e., higher risk) cohorts.  A statistical test is provided by the cross-derivative of RATE with respect 
to CCBAL and SCORE, shown in Panel D of Table 5.  The cross derivative is significantly negative 
indicating that the difference we found in the relationship between RATE and CCBAL at low scores and 
at high scores is a statistically significant one. 
  Figures 6 and 7 plot these estimated relationships for the 1998 and 2001 samples.  The predicted 
interest rate for revolvers is plotted, respectively for shoppers and non-shoppers with specified credit 
scores, in relation to revolving balance amounts (for this graphical analysis, the control variables Z are 
held constant near their sample mean values: $50,000 income, 14 years of schooling, and age between 35 
and 54.)  The selected credit scores roughly correspond to sub-prime (600 and 640), A− (680), prime 
(720), and super-prime (760) credits.  Predictions from equation (3) are plotted for revolving balance 
amounts ranging from $500 to $10,000, in increments of $500 (and for the starting value of $1).  Overall, 
the depicted relationships between rate and credit card balance support the view that informational   26
barriers to switching impede the ability of credit card customers to obtain a competitive interest rate 
through search. 
  The relationship between credit card interest rate, balances, and credit score for the subsamples. 
We also calculated the derivatives reported in Table 5 for the full sample for the three subgroups of 
households expected to be less subject to temporary liquidity shocks: homeowners; households with 
yearly income of $30,000 or more; and households with stock and bond holdings of $2,000 or more.  The 
results for the subgroups (which are available from the authors) are generally similar to those for the full 
sample, suggesting that reverse causality is not a significant problem. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Previous studies have argued that the informational structure of the credit card market gives rise 
to consumer switching costs and to adverse selection effects that, in turn, create barriers to competition.  
In particular, Calem and Mester (1995) argue that the informational structure implies that high balance 
customers face a lower probability of approval on new credit applications.   
The credit card market has evolved over the last decade.  In particular, advances in credit scoring 
technology and data quality have led to widespread use of automated systems for the prescreening and 
solicitation of card applicants.  Such advances may have improved issuers’ ability to judge 
creditworthiness and lowered evaluation costs.  Marketing innovations, such as the development of 
affinity card programs, also may have improved issuers’ ability to attract  higher credit-quality borrowers, 
which would also mitigate the adverse selection inherent in mass solicitation programs.   
If so, then the economic significance of information-based barriers to switching should be 
reduced, enabling the market to become more competitive.   In particular, if information-based barriers to 
switching have become less important, then pre-existing levels of household credit card debt should be 
less associated with credit denial in recent years in comparison to earlier years.  To the contrary, we find 
the relationship between card balance and credit denial to be little changed since 1989.  High-balance   27
households remain more likely to be rejected or to be granted a lower-than-desired credit limit when 
applying for new credit.   
We further test for the continuing importance of informational barriers to switching by 
investigating pricing effects, using new information in the 1998 and 2001 SCF on credit card interest 
rates.  For this analysis, we also rely on a pseudo credit score that we construct for each respondent to the 
SCF.  We analyze the relationship between credit card balances and interest rates, controlling for other 
observable risk characteristics via the pseudo credit score.  Particularly for consumers with lower scores, 
we find that a large credit card balance represents an impediment to obtaining a better interest rate. 
Taken together, our findings suggest that information-based barriers to switching have remained 
relevant in the credit card market despite the many changes seen in the market over the past decade.  
These findings, viewed within the context of the substantial growth in credit card borrowing since 1989, 
suggest that informational barriers to competition persist, but the level of credit card balances at which 
they become effective may have increased, possibly in part due to technological improvements.  While 
technological innovation may have greatly reduced search costs and improved credit screening 
capabilities, the persistence of switching costs and adverse selection may continue to afford market power 
to lenders with well-established customer relationships. 
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Table 1.  Variable Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations 
 
 
All dollar amounts are in $1,000 units and expressed in 1989 constant dollars. 
 
Variable Definition 1989 














       
TURNDOWN  1 if household is turned down for credit, in whole or in 


















DELINQUENT  1 if household was sometimes behind or missed 








MEXP_INC Major  monthly  expenditures (rent, property fees, 
mortgage and home loan payments, home equity loan 









CUREMP  Years head of household has been at current job; coded 
































EDU  Head of household’s highest grade of schooling 


















ATT_INST  1 if respondent believes buying things on installment is 








ATT_VACA  1 if respondent believes borrowing for a vacation trip 








ATT_JEWE  1 if respondent believes borrowing for a jewelry 








LIQ Total  household  liquid  assets, which includes 
















(1.4636)   31
Variable Definition 1989 














NONLIQ Total  household  non-liquid financial assets: which 
includes CD’s, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, quasi-
liquid retirement accounts (IRAs, thrift-type plans, 
future pensions), cash value of whole life insurance, 
cash value of life insurance, other financial assets 
(trusts, annuities, royalties, deferred compensation, 
































DEBT_INC Household  non-housing  and non-auto debt (excludes 
mortgages, home equity credit, other residential debt, 
















NO_HEALTH_INS  1 if not everyone in the household has health insurance 

















HSIZE_M  Number of individuals in household if the head of 









HSIZE_D  Number of individuals in household if the head of 









HSIZE_S  Number of individuals in household if the head of 









MAR_0034  1 if head of household is married or living with a 









MAR_3554  1 if head of household is married or living with a 








MAR_5564  1 if head of household is married and living with a 








DIV_0034  1 if head of household is divorced or separated and 34 








DIV_3554  1 if head of household is divorced or separated and 35 








SNG_0034  1 if head of household is widowed or never married 








(0.2436)   32
Variable Definition 1989 














SNG_3554  1 if head of household is widowed or never married 








NMAR_5564  1 if head of household is not married and not living 









NMAR_65  1 if head of household is not married and not living 









RATE  For households with revolving credit card balance, 
interest rate on card with largest balance; otherwise, 






        
SHOP  1 if respondent/household does more than a moderate 
amount of shopping when making major decisions 
about credit or borrowing (i.e., if respondent answers 4 
or 5 to SCF question); 
0 if hardly any to moderate shopping (i.e., if 







        
SCORE  SCF respondent’s pseudo credit score, imputed using a 
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Table 2. Relationship Between Credit Card Balances and the Likelihood of Being Turned Down 
For Credit for 1989, 1998, and 2001 
 
Dependent Variable: TURNDOWN = Turned Down for Credit in the Last 5 Years 
 
Dollar amounts measured in $1,000 and in 1989 constant dollars (based on the GDP chain-weighted price 
deflator).  Estimated using population-weighted data.  Includes respondents with at least one bank credit 
card. 
 
 1989  1998  2001 
  N = 2085  N = 3135  N = 3396 
                      
Variable   Estimate  Std  Error  T-Stat    Estimate  Std Error T-Stat    Estimate  Std Error T-Stat 
                       
Intercept  ***  −2.4353 0.4379  −5.5612  *** −0.9864 0.3085 −3.1970  ***  −1.5313 0.2931 −5.2238 
CCBAL  *  0.0270 0.0161  1.6792  *** 0.0352 0.0068  5.1633  ***  0.0266 0.0069  3.8529 
DELINQUENT  ***  0.3698 0.1068  3.4628  *** 0.5126 0.0755  6.7897  ***  0.5494 0.0759  7.2356 
MEXP_INC    0.0478 0.0310  1.5397    0.0424 0.0707  0.5995  ***  0.3514 0.0913  3.8476 
CUREMP  ***  −0.0160 0.0056  −2.8415  *** −0.0103 0.0040 −2.6092  **  −0.0076 0.0036 −2.0883 
CURADD  *  −0.0100 0.0057  −1.7408  *** −0.0128 0.0045 −2.8324  ***  −0.0143 0.0043 −3.2818 
HOMEOWN  *  −0.1772 0.1025  −1.7280  *** −0.2080 0.0739 −2.8147  ***  −0.2430 0.0706 −3.4408 
RACE  ***  0.5157 0.0984  5.2392    0.0303 0.0769  0.3941    −0.0058 0.0736 −0.0789 
EDU  **  0.0369 0.0174  2.1216    −0.0174 0.0136 −1.2722    0.0201 0.0137  1.4674 
AVAILBAL  **  −0.0125 0.0061  −2.0623  *** −0.0086 0.0027 −3.1927  **  −0.0064 0.0025 −2.5265 
ATT_INST    0.0147 0.0891  0.1648    −0.0343 0.0666 −0.5148    0.0756 0.0665  1.1362 
ATT_VACA    0.0024 0.1173  0.0208  *** −0.2454 0.0792 −3.1002    −0.1080 0.0766 −1.4102 
ATT_JEWE    0.1301 0.1518  0.8572    0.0513 0.1157  0.4433    0.0343 0.1113  0.3085 
ln(LIQ)    −0.0475 0.0408  −1.1636  **  −0.0771 0.0344 −2.2425  ***  −0.1497 0.0307 −4.8798 
ln(NONLIQ)    −0.0486 0.0330  −1.4718  **  −0.0443 0.0206 −2.1460  ***  −0.0714 0.0200 −3.5746 
ln(INC)  **  0.1812 0.0783  2.3139  **  0.1182 0.0584  2.0252  ***  0.2394 0.0587  4.0810 
DEBT_INC  ***  0.4360 0.1095  3.9831    0.0351 0.0451  0.7800    0.0140 0.0581  0.2408 
ZERO_DEBT  ***  −0.3918 0.1162  −3.3705  *** −0.4931 0.0919 −5.3647  ***  −0.4613 0.0810 −5.6978 
NO_HEALTH_INS    0.0863 0.1154  0.7477    0.0263 0.0810  0.3246    0.1028 0.0858  1.1982 
SELFEMP  ***  0.4266 0.1083  3.9379  *** 0.2299 0.0822  2.7963    0.0777 0.0838  0.9270 
HSIZE_M    −0.0399 0.0372  −1.0727  *** 0.0765 0.0293  2.6114    0.0073 0.0291  0.2501 
HSIZE_D    0.1031 0.0841  1.2260  *** 0.1822 0.0665  2.7403    −0.0361 0.0586 −0.6168 
HSIZE_S    0.0105 0.0725  0.1442    0.0157 0.0585  0.2679    0.0293 0.0581  0.5035 
MAR_0034  ***  0.6506 0.2463  2.6419  *** 0.6457 0.1790  3.6074  *  0.2916 0.1502  1.9418 
MAR_3554  **  0.5562 0.2393  2.3245  **  0.4064 0.1664  2.4423    0.1674 0.1393  1.2022 
MAR_5564    0.3530 0.2528  1.3965  **  0.4232 0.1793  2.3605    0.1150 0.1699  0.6766 
DIV_0034    −0.4911 0.5035  −0.9754  *** 0.8583 0.2905  2.9545  *  0.4788 0.2755  1.7379 
DIV_3554    0.3100 0.3232  0.9592  **  0.5562 0.2283  2.4364  *  0.3759 0.2068  1.8176 
SNG_0034    0.1913 0.3311  0.5777  *** 0.9640 0.2265  4.2562    0.2974 0.2069  1.4376 
SNG_3554    0.0886 0.3398  0.2607  *** 0.5965 0.2283  2.6124    0.2181 0.2141  1.0189 
NMAR_5564  *  0.5931 0.3083  1.9238  **  0.4736 0.2293  2.0654    0.3064 0.2018  1.5183 
NMAR_65    −0.1042 0.3229  −0.3225    −0.3088 0.2742 −1.1264    −0.3608 0.2454 −1.4702 
 
 
Significantly different from zero at significance level: *10%, **5%, ***1%   34
Table 3. Coefficient on Credit Card Balances (CCBAL) for Full Sample and for Subsamples of Households 
for 1989, 1998, and 2001 
 
Dependent Variable: TURNDOWN = Turned Down for Credit in the Last 5 Years 
 
Dollar amounts measured in $1,000 and in 1989 constant dollars (based on the GDP chain-weighted price 
deflator).  Estimated using population-weighted data.  Includes respondents with at least one bank credit card.  
 
 
 1989  1998  2001 



















Error  T-Stat 
                           
Full Sample  2085 * 0.0270 0.0161 1.679  3135 *** 0.0352 0.0068  5.163  3396  *** 0.0266 0.0069 3.853 
                    
Homeowners  1696 * 0.0325 0.0174 1.870  2405 *** 0.0290 0.0081  3.591  2596  *** 0.0300 0.0073 4.083 
                    
Households with 
yearly income of 
$30,000 or more 
1524 *** 0.0727  0.0191 3.807  2297 *** 0.0253 0.0080 3.151  2474 ** 0.0178 0.0076 2.357 
                     
Households with 
stock and bond 
holdings of 
$2,000 or more 
974 *** 0.0938  0.0312 3.010  1378 0.0200 0.0165 1.210  1432  *** 0.0232 0.0089 2.596 
                        
Households that 
applied for credit 
within the past 5 
years (this is 
available only in 
the 1998 and 
2001 surveys) 
         2197 *** 0.0334  0.0075  4.482  2356  *** 0.0235  0.0070 3.340 
                         
 
 
Significantly different from zero at significance level: *10%, **5%, ***1%   35
Table 4. Interest Rate Regressions  
 
Non-revolvers 
RATE = γ0 + γ1SHOP + SCORE × β1Y + γ2SCORE
2 + δZ + ε (2) 
 
   1998  2001 
   n=1867  n=2006 
Parameter  Variable    Estimate Std  Error  T-Stat    Estimate Std  Error  T-Stat 
                
γ0  Intercept  * 6088.5970 3292.4832  1.8492  −935.9888 1945.4029  −0.4811
γ1  SHOP  −527.3563 487.2155 −1.0824  −617.1571 416.6157 −1.4814
β11  SCORE×SHOP  −12.0037 9.1445  −1.3127 7.2973  5.5041  1.3258
β12  SCORE×(1−SHOP)  −12.6693 9.0897  −1.3938 6.5226  5.5038  1.1851
γ2  SCORE
2  0.0088 0.0063  1.3825  −0.0046 0.0039  −1.1783
δ1  ln(INC)   −23.6646 14.4380  −1.6391 10.8249  14.5110  0.7460
δ2  EDU  * 7.4366 4.4104  1.6862  −2.9325 5.1118  −0.5737
δ3  AGE_3554  * 60.3627 35.8299 1.6847  −3.1289 38.7530  −0.0807
δ4  AGE_5564  ** 92.9645 45.5156 2.0425  74.8815  61.8253  1.2112
δ5  AGE_65 78.0862  50.6560  1.5415 17.3119  52.8904  0.3273
                 
  Adjusted R
2 =       0.0140       0.0054   
 
Revolvers 
RATE = γ0 + γ1SHOP + SCORE×β1Y + CCBAL×β2Y + γ2SCORE
2 + γ3SCORE×CCBAL  
    + CCBAL
2×β3Y + γ4SCORE×CCBAL
2 + δZ + ε     (3) 
 
   1998  2001 
   n=1265  n=1390 
Parameter  Variable    Estimate  Std Error  T-Stat    Estimate  Std Error  T-Stat 
                 
γ0  Intercept  −65.5972 1724.9426  −0.0380 472.6754  1673.9713  0.2824 
γ1  SHOP  *** 1073.3659 369.7840  2.9027  −45.8841 367.4816  −0.1249 
β11  SCORE×SHOP 5.2827  5.2049 1.0149  7.3644  5.0105 1.4698 
β12  SCORE×(1−SHOP) 6.9002  5.1352  1.3437  7.4758  4.9453  1.5117 
β21  CCBAL×SHOP  *** 0.2448 0.0764  3.2062  0.1179  0.0718  1.6421 
β22  CCBAL×(1−SHOP)  *** 0.2568 0.0756  3.3949  * 0.1273  0.0686  1.8537 
γ2  SCORE
2  −0.005656 0.003793  −1.4912 * −0.006862 0.003724  −1.8426 
γ3  SCORE×CCBAL  *** −0.0004018 0.0001122  −3.5799 * −0.0001896 0.0001041  −1.8222 
β31  CCBAL
2×SHOP  ** −7.5485×10
−6 2.9522×10
−6  −2.5569 * −3.2795×10
−6 1.753×10
−6  −1.8710 
β32  CCBAL
2×(1−SHOP)  *** −7.6448×10
−6 2.8972×10
−6  −2.6386 ** −3.3936×10
−6 1.693×10
−6  −2.0046 
γ4  SCORE×CCBAL
2  *** 1.23×10
−8 4.5×10
−9 2.7602  ** 5.1×10
−9 2.6×10
−9 1.9801 
δ1  ln(INC)  * −33.8362 20.1906  −1.6758 *** −68.1592 21.1262 −3.2263 
δ2  EDU  * −11.0859 5.9897  −1.8508 ** −15.7189 6.5692  −2.3928 
δ3  AGE_3554 30.7368  34.4412  0.8924 52.1658  37.5835 1.3880 
δ4  AGE_5564  ** 119.6250 50.7668 2.3564  31.7622  52.5001 0.6050 
δ5  AGE_65 93.8584  63.1564  1.4861  * 165.7024 95.6139  1.7330 
            
  Adjusted R
2   0.0940     0.0960   
 
Significantly different from zero at significance level: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Adjusted R
2s are the average across the five estimations corresponding to the five implicates.   36
Table 5. Derivatives of the Interest Rate Regressions 
  Mean values and standard errors of the means in each subgroup 
Panel A.  Derivative of credit card interest rate with respect to credit score 
     Non-revolvers: 
11 12 2
RATE






  Revolvers:       
2
11 12 2 3 4
RATE
SHOP (1 SHOP) 2 SCORE CCBAL CCBAL
SCORE
ββ γ γ γ
∂
=+ − + + +
∂
     1998 2001  1998  2001 
           
Shoppers Est    1.162* 0.5225  −3.256***  −2.478*** 
 Std  err    0.6301 0.5788  0.4831  0.5055 
 T-stat    1.849 0.903  −6.739  −4.902 
           
           
Non-shoppers Est    0.5814  −0.3217  −1.765***  −2.141*** 
 Std  err    0.6370 0.5298  0.3633  0.3477 
 T-stat    0.913  −0.607  −4.859  −6.159 
 
Panel B. Derivative of credit card interest rate with respect to shopping propensity 
     Non-revolvers: 
11 1 1 2
RATE







  Revolvers:       
2
11 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 3 2
RATE




=+ − + − + −
∂
     1998 2001  1998  2001 
           
Shoppers Est    −25.49  −38.65  −90.80***  −146.8*** 
and Std  err    23.91 24.42  29.72  31.59 
Non-shoppers T-stat    −1.066  −1.582  −3.055  −4.648 
           
 
Panel C. Derivative of credit card interest rate with respect to credit card balance for three score categories 
 
 Revolvers: 
21 21 31 32 3 4
RATE
SHOP (1 SHOP) 2 SHOP CCBAL 2 (1 SHOP) CCBAL SCORE 2 SCORE CCBAL
CCBAL
ββ β β γ γ
∂
=+ − + × + − × ++ ×
∂
   1998  2001 
      Score =  
Low 
Score =  
Mid 








               
Shoppers Est    −0.0011  −0.0217***  −0.0417***  −0.0008  −0.0097  −0.0201** 
 Std  err    0.0079 0.0064  0.0084  0.0083  0.0065  0.0086 
 T-stat    −0.140  −3.394  −4.942  −0.097  −1.497  −2.333 
               
Non-shoppers Est    0.0105  −0.0102*  −0.0345*** 0.0105  −0.0017  −0.0119 
 Std  err    0.0079 0.0058  0.0094  0.0073  0.0057  0.0097 
 T-stat    1.333  −1.764  −3.671 1.440 −0.297  −1.224 
 
Panel D.  Cross-derivative of credit card interest rate 










     1998 2001 
        
Shoppers and  Est    −0.00031***  −0.00015* 
Non-shoppers Std  err    0.000085 0.000090 
 T-stat    −3.649  −1.722 
 
Significantly different from zero at significance level: *10%, **5%, ***1% 
Categories: Score low is 0 ≤ Score < 660; Score mid is 660 ≤ Score < 700; Score high is 700 ≤ Score. 
Derivative is evaluated for each observation in the subgroup using values of all variables for that observation.  Mean of the derivative is calculated 
for all observations in the subgroup, and standard error of the mean is calculated.  Means and standard errors are reported in the table 

























































































































































































































































Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions.
Source: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis
Nonrevolving Credit as Percent of Disposable Personal Income
Revolving Credit as Percent of Disposable Personal Income  38
Figure 2
















































































































































































































































Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions.
Source: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis
Nonrevolving Credit as Percent of Total Consumer Credit
Revolving Credit as Percent of Total Consumer Credit  39
Figure 3
Delinquency and Charge-off Rates on 




















































































































































Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions.
Source: Federal Reserve Board
Charge-off Rate on 
Credit Card Loans
Delinquency Rate on 
Other Consumer Loans
Charge-off Rate on 
Other Consumer Loans
Delinquency Rate on 
Credit Card Loans  40
 
Figure 4
Credit Card Rates, Personal Loan Rate, 




















































































































































































































































Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions.
Source:Commercial Bank Interest Rates: Credit Card Plans:All Accounts (NSA,%), 24-Month Personal Loan Rate (NSA, %), 
6-Month CD Rate, Secondary Market (%), 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate, Secondary Market (%), Federal Reserve Board and Haver Analytics
Credit Card Rate
6-Month CD Rate
3-Month Treasury Bill Rate





Spread Between Credit Card Rate and 
Personal Loan Rate, 6-Month CD Rate,



















































































































































































































































Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions.
Source: Commercial Bank Interest Rates: Credit Card Plans: All Accounts (NSA,%), 24-Month Personal Loan Rate (NSA, %), 
6-Month CD Rate, Secondary Market (%), 3-Month Treasury Bill Rate, Secondary Market (%), Federal Reserve Board and Haver Analytics
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